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In Defense of Five Million: Taxpayers
Who Fail To File Returns
Christopher Johnson*
I. Introduction
The General Accounting Office has estimated that about five
million individuals and couples with tax liabilities of about two bil-
lion dollars did not file the required income tax returns for the tax
year 1972.1 With the onslaught of tax protester movements in recent
years and the escalating rate of inflation and rising incomes that
pushes more taxpayers above the minimum income filing require-
ments, it is reasonable to assume that this statistic has remained at
least relatively constant through the succeeding years.2 What many
of these nonfilers may not fully appreciate is that "[any person...
required by (Title 26 of the United States Code) . . . to make a re-
turn . . . , who willfully fails . . . to make such return . . . at the
time or times required by law or regulations, shall,. . . be guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution." 3
A large percentage of the American citizenry, whether they are
* B.A. Muhlenberg College; J.D. Dickinson School of Law. This article is being pub-
lished under a pen name at the request of the author.
i. Gen. Acct. Office, Report to the Congress, Who's Not Filing Income Tax Returns (July
i1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Report to Congress]. Tax year 1972 data was used because it
provided the most current and best available data at the time of the report.
2. Sixty-three million individual income tax returns were filed in 1972. Accordingly,
eight percent of those required to file did not do so. This number increased to 87 million in
1978. Id at I, 5. If the eight percent figure remained constant, 7 million individuals failed to
file in 1979.
3. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1980) (emphasis added). This article will be concerned primarily
with the nonfiling of individual income tax returns which are required pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§ 6012 (1976). The threshold gross income that will trigger the filing requirement for 1979,
whether or not a tax is due is as follows:
Single under 65 $3300
Single over 65 4300
Married filing jointly:
both under 65 5400
both over 65 7400
Married filing separately 1000
aware of it or not,4 may be committing a federal crime. With in-
creased computer sophistication and pressure from Congress and the
General Accounting Office to utilize additional manpower to catch
nonfilers, the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Reve-
nue Service will continue to pursue prosecutions under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7203 with great frequency.5 Accordingly, it will be the rare tax
practitioner who tiptoes through his career without having to advise
a client who has failed to file a tax return. This article will examine
defenses to the charge of willful failure to file and procedures for the
practitioner to employ in presenting these defenses before the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and the Department of Justice. 6 As noted by
other commentators, it is difficult to predict from a simple perusal of
case law what considerations will influence the Government to de-
cline a criminal prosecution.7 Therefore this article will occasionally
rely on common sense and experience in criminal tax matters to sug-
gest worthwhile lines of defense.
II. The Government's Burden
The Seventh Circuit has provided the most popular definition of
the prima facie failure to file case in United States v. Matosky."8
[T]he Government has proven its case when it has established be-
yond a reasonable doubt: that the defendant was required to file a
return; that he knew he was so required; and that he willfully or
purposefully, as distinguished from inadvertently, negligently, or
mistakenly, failed to file such a return.
9
Since willfulness is rarely subject to direct proof, it may be proved
4. United States v. Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir. 1972) (it is no defense that
taxpayer did not know that nonfiling is a crime).
5. In 1978, the efforts of the Criminal Investigation Division resulted in 717 recom-
mended prosecutions and 356 convictions. Report to Congress, supra note 1, at 3. Although
hundreds of decisions under 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1976) have been reported, the case law is not
fully developed, particularly with respect to "returns" filed by tax protesters. See note 84 and
accompanying text infra.
6. The taxpayer will have four opportunities to present criminal defenses in the admin-
istrative criminal tax procedure:
(1) Before the Criminal Investigation Division if requested, See Treas. Reg.
§ 601.107(b)(2) (1968);
(2) Before District Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service (a conference is usually of-
fered by letter);
(3) Before the Department of Justice if requested; and
(4) Before the Assistant United States Attorney.
Each agency or division may be receptive to different defenses. In 1977, Internal Revenue
Service statistics indicate that the District Counsel declined 264 criminal recommendations
from its own Criminal Investigation Division, the Department of Justice declined 222 cases
recommended by the District Counsel, and the United States Attorneys declined 274 cases
referred by the Department of Justice. Chief Counsel.4nnualReport FY 1977, Department of
Treasury, Publication 1076 (1978).
7. See, e.g., J. Boughner, How Practitioners Should Handle Wilful Failure to File Cases,
32 J. OF TAX. 46 (1970).
8. 421 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 904 (1970).
9. Id at 413.
totally by circumstantial evidence."0 Willfulness, therefore, becomes
a matter for the jury to decide under proper instructions."
The Government's case may consist merely of evidence of the
nonfiling,' 2 the gross income of the taxpayer for the year,' 3 and per-
haps evidence of a prior filing history to establish the taxpayer's
knowledge of the return requirement.' 4 Additionally, the Govern-
ment may introduce Forms W-2 and 1099 that were issued to the
taxpayer to show that he was reminded of his income and duty to
file.' 5
The defense could argue that the Government has failed to meet
its burden of proof. It is unlikely, however, that a passive defense
will prove successful. As previously noted, the Government's prima
facie case is easily proved. Moreover, the Government's conviction
rate in criminal tax cases is extremely high, which indicates that it is
highly selective in accepting cases for prosecution. The Government
today will rarely bring a criminal prosecution where the tax defi-
ciency is de minimis or the gross income, which triggers the filing
requirement, is barely above the threshold amount.' 6 This author
found no reported cases in which the Government failed to prove
that the gross income was above the threshold filing requirement.
An examination of cases indicates that the Government will
rarely prosecute a case in which the taxpayer has failed to file only
one time. Therefore, the Government's case is significantly bolstered
by the defendant's failure to file a return in successive years, which is
itself suggestive of willfulness.' 7
Minimal evidence is actually needed to obtain a section 7203
conviction for willful failure to file a tax return. Accordingly, the
principle methods of successfully defending a failure to file case are
10. Gaunt v. United States, 184 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1951).
11. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
12. Self-authenticated, officially-certified I.R.S. computer printouts that show unfiled tax
returns are accepted as proof of nonfiled tax returns. United States v. Farris, 517 F.2d 227 (7th
Cir. 1975).
13. See United States v. Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1972); Shy v. United States,
383 F. Supp. 673 (D. Del. 1975) (the Government can use the net worth method of proof to
show that the taxpayer was required to file a return).
14. The case law has placed taxpayer in a "catch-22" dilemma with respect to his prior
filing history. The taxpayer's filing of timely returns in prior years is evidence that permits the
inference that he knew the law required him to file returns and that he willfully failed to do so.
United States v. McCabe, 416 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1058 (1970).
Evidence that the taxpayer failed to file returns in other years, however, also suggests willful-
ness and a course of conduct in ignoring the obligation. See United States v. Ostendorff, 371
F.2d 729 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982 (1967); United States v. Litman, 246 F.2d 206 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 869 (1957).
15. United States v. Cirillo, 251 F.2d 638, 639, n.9 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
949 (1958).
16. See INT. REV. MAN. 9132 suggesting that criminal tax cases involving nominal tax
deficiencies should be avoided.
17. United States v. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d 729, 731 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982
(1967); United States v. Litman, 246 F.2d 206, 208 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 869 (1957).
(1) attack a procedural defect in the Service's handling of the crimi-
nal investigation; (2) argue that Service policy will not be served by
criminally prosecuting this particular taxpayer or that equitable rea-
sons exist for not prosecuting this taxpayer; and (3) produce some
affirmative evidence that the crime was not committed. The latter
defense involves principally proof that the nonfiling was not willful.
III. Procedural Defenses
A. Government's Failure to Follow its Own Procedures
The tax practitioner or criminal tax attorney will often be re-
tained by a taxpayer after the taxpayer has been interviewed by spe-
cial agents of the Criminal Investigation Division and/or after the
taxpayer has had delinquent returns prepared and filed with the
agents. It may appear that defense of the case is now hopeless be-
cause the taxpayer has confessed to virtually everything but murder
in the first degree.
At this stage, however, the attorney should question the tax-
payer carefully with respect to the agents' prior conduct. It may be
possible to have the damning testimony suppressed if one can
demonstrate an indiscretion committed by the Service during its in-
vestigation.
Instances of failure to give Miranda warnings in initial inter-
views with taxpayers suspected of tax fraud may be rare. Authority
exists, however, for suppressing evidence obtained in warningless in-
terviews even though such warnings are not mandated by constitu-
tional decisional law.' 8
On October 3, 1967, the Service issued a News Release which,
in essence, stated that special agents would give Miranda type warn-
ings in interviews with the taxpayer during a criminal investiga-
tion.' 9 An interview conducted in violation of this published
procedure lead to the decision of United States v. Leahey. 20 The
court in Leahey examined the purpose of this procedure, which was
admittedly to safeguard the constitutional rights of persons sus-
pected of tax fraud. The issue in Leahey was framed as follows:
whether we must exclude this evidence so that agencies will be
compelled to adhere to the standards of behavior that they have
formally and purposefully adopted in the light of the requirements
of the Constitution, even though these standards may go some-
what farther than the Constitution requires.
2 1
18. United States v. Sourapas, 515 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Leahey, 434
F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969). Miranda warn-
ings are not required to be given to taxpayers in a noncustodial situation. See Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
19. I.R.S. News Release No. 897, October 3, 1967.
20. 434 F.2d 7 (Ist Cir. 1970).
21. Id at 10.
The court concluded that due process required the I.R.S. to fol-
low the published procedure and that the evidence obtained in viola-
tion of such procedures must be excluded.
Similarly, in United States v. Toussaint,22 the court ruled that
continuation of an I.R.S. investigation without informing the tax-
payer of the possibility of criminal prosecution, in contravention of
rules in the I.R.S. "Audit Technique Handbook for Internal Reve-
nue Agents," breached the Service's implied contracts with the pub-
lic that it will follow its own rules.23 In Toussaint as in Leahey, the
court was concerned with the purpose of the internal regulation. In
this instance, the Service itself recognized that taxpayers were more
inclined to cooperate with revenue agents than with special agents.
By continuing an investigation past the permissible point, that at
which there were firm indications of fraud, the revenue agent was
found to have obtained information through fraud and deceit. The
further interrogation of the taxpayer prior to referral of the case to a
special agent violated the taxpayer's fourth and fourteenth amend-
ment rights.
The Supreme Court has shrouded the above cases with a degree
of uncertainty in United States v. Caceres,24 by ruling that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service is not required to follow all their procedural
rules to the letter where compliance is not mandated by the Constitu-
tion or by statute. In Caceres the Internal Revenue Service con-
ducted a "consensual" electronic surveillance without getting the
final prior approval from Justice Department officials as required by
the Internal Revenue Manual, a public document. The Court partic-
ularly noted that the taxpayer could not reasonably contend: (1) that
he relied on the regulations; (2) that their breach had any effect on
his conduct; or (3) that his rights were in any way impaired. The
taxpayer's conduct did not depend upon the approval or disapproval
of a Justice Department official.
Caceres may be a decision of very limited import. It may not
overrule the decisions discussed above where the taxpayers could
certainly argue that the failure to follow Internal Revenue Service
procedures mislead them with regards to the nature and seriousness
of the investigation.
The Supreme Court's rationale in Caceres may be summarized
as follows:
(1) It is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own proce-
22. 456 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D. Tex. 1978). The court found that the taxpayer's fourth and
fourteenth amendment rights had been violated.
23. INT. REV. MAN. 9322.1 provides that if an examiner discovers firm indications of
fraud, he will suspend his activities at the earliest practicable opportunity and forward a report
to the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division.
24. 440 U.S. 741 (1979). See Note, 85 DICK. L. REV. 183 (1980).
dures where the rights of individuals are affected.25
(2) A court's duty to enforce an agency regulation is most evi-
dent when compliance with the regulation is mandated by the
Constitution or federal law.
26
(3) There may be instances when the Court should enforce
the procedure even though there is no constitutional or statutory
violations.27
(4) The circumstances in Caceres presented no reasons why a
court should exercise what discretion it may have to exclude evi-
dence obtained in violation of the procedure.28
Clearly the door has been left wide open for further attacks on
the Service's failure to follow its procedures and regulations.
Notwithstanding Caceres, the factual situations of Leahey and Tous-
saint may be decided today exactly as they were previously, since in
those two instances the courts found compelling and constitutional
reasons to enforce the internal procedures.
A manual provision that has not been judicially tested but
which has specific importance in the failure to file domain is I.R.M.
5(12)22, "Guidelines for Initial Taxpayer Contact, Return Compli-
ance Programs." This provision states, in part, that "before soliciting
a delinquent return, revenue officers should determine whether or
not a referral [to the Criminal Investigation Division] is justified
based upon the fraud indicators in I.R.M. 5(12)23.1:(1). ' '29 The
manual further provides that "[c]oUection activity personnel will sus-
pend activities as soon as possible after indications of fraud are un-
covered. ' 3' A revenue officer is often the first I.R.S. employee to
investigate an instance of nonfiling. He is required to make an initial
determination of whether the case has criminal implications which
warrant a referral to the Criminal Investigation Division. If a refer-
ral to the Criminal Investigation Division is justified, delinquent re-
turns are not to be solicited. If the revenue officer solicits a
delinquent return, he is inferring to the taxpayer that no criminal
investigation will be pursued if the information is supplied. The so-
25. ld. at 751 n.14.
26. Id at 749.
27. Id at 755, 756.
28. Id at 756.
29. INT. REV. MAN. 5(12)22(f)(5). These fraud indicators, if not present, can provide
arguments for the taxpayer that a criminal case does not exist. The fraud indicators identified
in the Manual include:
(a) a substantial tax liability involving at least two taxable years;
(b) a sophisticated taxpayer;
(c) inability or refusal to explain nonfiling;
(d) misleading statements;
(e) history of nonfiling coupled with ability to pay;
() concealment of assets;
(g) unusual payment of business expenses with cash or cashing of business re-
ceipts; and
(h) attempts to interfere in the investigation.
30. INT. REV. MAN. 5(12)23.2(l).
licitation is in the nature of a civil compromise.3 Furthermore, for
reasons discussed in Toussaint, further information gathering by the
revenue officer, after observing firm indications of fraud, may violate
the taxpayer's fourth amendment rights and at least provide grounds
for suppression of testimony given to the Service.
When a decision has been made to file a delinquent return, a
decision to be discussed below, the taxpayer may even plant the seed
of solicitation by asking the revenue officer for advice as to his future
conduct. Often the advice will be to file delinquent returns. Once
this course has been determined,32 it is to the taxpayer's advantage to
submit the returns prior to the appearance of any special agent. The
purpose of this strategy is twofold. It may convince the revenue of-
ficer to treat the case as a simple late filing, rather than a potential
fraud referral. Should the case be referred to the criminal division, it
may influence that division to decline to prosecute in light of the
solicitation issue. If the filing in response to a solicitation or semi-
solicitation does nothing more than present counsel with an equita-
ble argument in the administrative conferences, it is at least an edge
which may affect someone's judgment in the chain of command.
Conversely, in flagrant instances of nonfiling, the delinquent returns
may be given no mitigating consideration.
In conclusion, any procedural defect in the criminal investiga-
tion should be brought to the attention of the Government. 33 Its ef-
fect cannot be predicted, but it may be assumed that the
Government does not wish to constantly place its mistakes before the
courts and test the seriousness of them, particularly when they tend
to mislead or prejudice the taxpayer. Naturally, when the Govern-
ment's error is harmless, as in Caceres, one can assume that the case
will be prosecuted.
B. The Fatal Indictment
A rare defense to a failure to file charge, but one that should not
be overlooked, is an attack on the indictment for failing to accurately
state the proper due date for the filing of an income tax return. In
Goldstein v. United States,34 the indictment was actually dismissed
31. In United States v. Collins, 457 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1972), the Sixth Circuit ruled that
the taxpayer was entitled to a jury instruction to the effect that if the taxpayer, who had once
been visited by revenue agents who helped him prepare returns for three years past, believed
that another revenue agent would come around to collect any taxes owed in future years, he
could be acquitted for the section 7203 charge.
32. See notes 48 through 64 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the filing of
delinquent returns.
33. Internal Revenue Manual provisions will not always be admissible. See Cooley v.
United States, 501 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1974) (the manual provi-
sions did not support the defense that the taxpayer believed he was not required to file a
return).
34. 502 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1974). Cf United States v. Pandilidis, 524 F.2d 644 (6th Cir.
when it failed to note that the due date for the return had been ex-
tended past April 15.11 The court reasoned that the grand jury had
weighed the defendant's state of mind on the wrong day and in the
wrong circumstances. Although most failure to file charges will now
be brought by information, which is amendable, Goldstein, if carried
to its extreme, may hold that if an indictment read "April 15" as the
due date for the return and April 15 were a weekend day, the indict-
ment would be subject to challenge.36 One must recognize though,
that this slight variation is of a completely different nature than the
error in Goldstein, where a request for an extension of time had been
filed.
IV. Equitable Arguments to be made Before the Internal
Revenue Service, the Department of Justice and the
Jury
A. A De Minimis Tax Deficiency
Should a case arise in which the taxpayer is able to show that
his deductions or losses are such that no tax was due, every effort
should be made to impress upon the Government that the case lacks
jury appeal. Although the criminal statute does not require a tax
liability,37 nor must the Government prove an intent to defraud,
38
the actual amount of the tax liability will be extremely relevant
where the defense is based upon an honest belief by the taxpayer
that he did not have to file a return if no tax was owed. 39 Further, if
the taxpayer actually owed no tax for the year in question, then al-
though he may be guilty of a technical violation, it would not nor-
mally be a case of sufficient magnitude to justify criminal
prosecution in the eyes of the Government.4'
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976) (court ruled that trial court's permission to amend
indictment by bill of particulars to take into account extensions was harmless error and not of
constitutional dimensions).
As to when the offense of failure to file is committed, see Tilzer, Where Does the Taxpayer
Commit the Offense of Willfully Failing to File His Return, 45 J. OF TAX. 54 (1977).
35. When an extension of time for filing is granted and no return is ever filed, the statute
of limitations runs from the end of the extension period. United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222
(1969); United States v. Twining, [1975-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9768 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
36. See 26 U.S.C. § 7503 (1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.6072-1(d) (1968).
37. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
38. United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Fahey, 411 F.2d
1213 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 957 (1970) (willfulness need not entail a purpose to
evade tax or to defraud).
39. See United States v. Walker, 479 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1973), in which a conviction was
reversed because the trial court admitted prejudicial evidence about an increase in net worth to
prove willfulness after the Government had already established a duty to file. If the taxpayer
presented evidence that he had no tax liability and therefore believed that he was not required
to file, the Government could introduce evidence to prove the tax liability of the taxpayer.
40. Boughner, supra note 7, at 46.
B. Cooperation: Filing Delinquent Returns and the Payment of
Liabilities
If a client approaches counsel prior to any investigation by the
Service with the revelation that he has not filed a tax return, delin-
quent returns should be filed immediately4' or at the very least, the
tax liabilities should be paid anonymously. 42 Although the Service
no longer assures nonprosecution in a truly voluntary, conscience
motivated disclosure, it will rarely prosecute in the face of such a
disclosure.43 To advise otherwise increases the risk of a criminal
prosecution at a later date if the taxpayer is discovered.
More commonly, the nonfiling client will come to counsel after
he has been discovered by the Internal Revenue Service. Assuming
the client has retained counsel prior to confessing to special agents,
the attorney must fully review the case and make a decision as to
whether the taxpayer should cooperate with the Service, open his
books and records, and/or file delinquent returns. Cooperation in
the investigation has been a favorite subject of commentators for
many years." The general consensus is that only under the rarest
circumstances should counsel cooperate with investigators or subject
his client to an interview.
Two conceivable situations in which one might agree to an in-
terview are (1) when your client insists on an interview and is so
obviously innocent and convincing that an interview will guarantee
the withdrawal of special agents from the case45 and (2) when your
client is so pathetic, uneducated, and/or infirm that not even the In-
ternal Revenue Service would seek prosecution. The latter situation
is known as the "poor slob" defense. Although it will occasionally
lead to withdrawal of the special agents, the dangers of extracting a
full confession in an interview are so great that the defense is best
presented only by counsel. A tact which may alleviate pressure from
the special agents and portray at least an aura of cooperation is to
submit the client to an interview solely with regard to biographical
information. A general rule of thumb, however, is that when in
doubt, do not cooperate with special agents.46
41. The Treasury Department on January 10, 1952, formally abandoned its long-stand-
ing "voluntary disclosure policy." Treas. Dep't Info. Release No. S-2930. I.R.S. News Release
IR-432 (December 13, 1961) notes, however, that the Service will carefully consider a volun-
tary disclosure in deciding whether to prosecute.
42. See United States v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965) (attorney need not dis-
close name of taxpayer making anonymous payment).
43. This view is generally shared by the tax bar. See Boughner, supra note 7, at 46.
44. A most thorough discussion of the pros and cons of cooperation can be found in J.
BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION, Chapter 6 (3d ed. 1976).
45. See Tilzer, Protecting the Client's Rights During the Tax Fraud Investigation Process,
41 J. OF TAX. 356 (1974).
46. Barnett, Procedures in Tax Fraud Investigations, 47 TAXES 807, 814 (1969). See also
Bacon, IRS and the Criminal Lawyer, 7 TRIAL 33-4 (1971). Ross, What Every Lawyer Should
Contrary to the opinion of many commentators who weigh non-
cooperation as a negative to the extent that it will alienate the special
agent and propel him to vehemently investigate the case,47 it is now
so commonplace for attorneys to resist disclosures and interviews
that this should no longer be a factor.
The most difficult decision to make and the most critical in any
failure to file case is whether to file a delinquent return subsequent to
the entry of I.R.S. agents into the case. The dangers of filing a delin-
quent return are several.
First, a delinquent return provides the jury or the court with a
full confession 41 of the taxpayer's duty to file. As noted previously
however, the duty to file is rarely in question, at least as far as
threshold dollar amounts are concerned. It is difficult to predict the
effect a return "confession" will have on the jury. One likely re-
sponse is that if the taxpayer could file soon after contact by the
Service, why could he not have filed on time. Furthermore, admis-
sions greatly simplify the Government's presentation at trial. In so-
phisticated criminal tax cases, it is often to the benefit of the defense
to make the case as difficult and complex as possible for the jurors so
that they will be less inclined to convict.
Second, the filing of a delinquent return, if fraudulent, can turn
what would have been a misdemeanor into a felony.4 9 Spies v.
United States,50 teaches that if the taxpayer does nothing more than
totally disregard the filing obligation, he is subject only to the sanc-
tions of a misdemeanor for failing to file a return. Furthermore, a
fraudulent delinquent return can subject the client to a civil fraud
penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6653(b), which may not otherwise be ap-
plicable if there is merely a failure to file. 51 Accordingly, if the tax-
Know About Tax Evasion andFraud Cases, 54 A.B.A.J. 1102 (1968); FREEMAN AND FREEMAN,
THE TAX PRACTICE HANDBOOK, § 10-5 (1973).
47. Research Institute of America, 25 FED. TAX COORDINATOR 2d V-3406 (1980) de-
scribes the following consequences of failing to cooperate:
(1) the suspicions of agents are increased;
(2) it will leave a bad impression on the jury; and
(3) it may lead to an increased sentence.
The following are listed as advantages of cooperation:
(1) it allays the suspicions of the agents;
(2) it is evidence of good faith if the case goes to the jury; and
(3) it tends to decrease the sentence if convicted.
48. See United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 (1954) (conviction sustained primarily
on admissions); Benes v. Canary, 224 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1955); Vloutis v. United States, 219
F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1955).
49. A false return could subject the taxpayer to a charge of attempted tax evasion under
26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1980) or filing a false and fraudulent income tax return under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(1) (1980).
50. 317 U.S. 492 (1943) (section 7201 involves some willful commission in addition to a
willful omission). Cf. United States v. Kafes, 214 F.2d 887 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 348 U.S. 887
(1954) (failure to file plus "attempt" to evade equals evasion).
51. See Bolden v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1232 (1978) (fraud penalty approved
for fraudulent delinquent returns). Although there is no need to prove an "attempt" to evade
payer has substantial income which he refuses to report under any
circumstances and/or if the taxpayer wishes to file a return which is
not totally accurate, he should be advised not to file a delinquent
return, and to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. Never-
theless, the taxpayer could make an advance payment on his tax lia-
bility without the danger of filing an amended return. Although the
advance payment will not satisfy the continuing obligation to file a
return, it may produce the same subtle mitigating effect upon the
Government.
Third, the filing of a delinquent return should never include an
admission to the fraud penalties.52 Such conduct is practically an
admission of willfulness. Furthermore, even payment of all the civil
liabilities and penalties will not preclude a criminal prosecution.53
Fourth, if the taxpayer's defense to the section 7203 charge is
based on an alleged good faith belief that he was not required to file
an income tax return, the filing of a delinquent return may destroy
the effectiveness of that position. For example, if the taxpayer claims
that he did not believe a filing was required because no tax was owed
and a delinquent return shows a substantial tax liability, the defense
is practically worthless. Similarly, if the defense is that the income
tax laws are unconstitutional or that the taxpayer was exercising his
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a delin-
quent return is filed, the jury will question the taxpayer's good faith
at the time of the nonfiling.
The obvious intention in filing a delinquent return is to con-
vince the Government and later the judge or jury that: (1) the failure
to file, now corrected, was perhaps negligent but certainly not crimi-
nal; (2) the taxpayer is repentent; (3) the taxpayer never truly in-
tended to evade his taxes;54 and (4) the overall circumstances of this
nonfiling suggest that the case is better handled civilly than crimi-
nally. One can see that the dangers in filing an amended return are
concrete and possibly severe, while the advantages are speculative at
tax to sustain the civil fraud penalty under 26 U.S.C. § 6653(b), the Government must still
prove a specific intent to evade tax. Compare Jones v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.
1958) (failure to file insufficient to sustain fraud penalty) with Blackwell v. Commissioner, 24
T.C.M. (CCH) 1367 (1965) (fraud penalty sustained in failure to file case). In examining the
case law, one could conclude that it is actually easier to obtain a criminal conviction for willful
failure to file than it is to sustain the civil fraud penalty.
52. See generally, Interest of Tax Practitioners in Fraud Cases on Increase, 2 J. OF TAx 41
(1955).
53. It is no defense to a criminal charge that the taxpayer paid the civil penalties. Slick v.
United States, I F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1925). See also United States v. Ming, 466 F.2d 1000 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915 (1973) (late filing and late payment are immaterial to
willfulness). In the same vein, United States v. Sansone, 380 U.S. 343 (1965) held that "the
intent to report the income and pay the tax sometime in the future does not vitiate the willful-
ness required by section 7203." Id. at 354.
54. See notes 24 and 53 and accompanying text supra. Procrastination, however, is no
defense to a section 7203 suit. Hull v. United States, [1976-1] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9181
(10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Browney, 421 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1970).
best. Equitable arguments may persuade the agency not to prose-
cute, but if this strategy fails, the same arguments may prove inad-
missible before the jury because the defenses presented may not be
considered legal in nature.
There is one further potential strategic advantage to be gained
by filing a delinquent return. The filing of a non-fraudulent delin-
quent return will start the running of the three year civil statute of
limitations on assessment even if the failure to file was deliberate
and fraudulent with the intent to evade tax." Normally, the civil
statute remains open during a criminal investigation because of
fraud or the nonfiling.5 6
There is an expressed Service policy not to issue statutory no-
tices of deficiency57 in open criminal tax investigations.58 The rea-
sons for this policy are twofold. First, the Government does not wish
to disclose its entire criminal case to the taxpayer in a civil proceed-
ing in which the rules of discovery are broad.59 Second, the Govern-
ment may lose the civil case and be faced with a collateral estoppel
argument in the criminal trial.'
Notwithstanding usual I.R.S. practice of not issuing statutory
notices in open criminal cases in which non-fraudulent delinquent
returns are concerned, the I.R.S. may feel that protection of revenue
demands that a notice be issued. If a statutory notice is not issued,
any additional civil liabilities not shown on the delinquent return,
including the civil fraud penalty, are beyond assessment.
It is very possible that three years will pass from the date of
filing the delinquent return to the criminal trial for willful failure to
file. If this happens, the Government will solicit consent to extend
the statute of limitations.6 Counsel will have to decide whether to
pressure the Service into issuing a statutory notice of deficiency. If
the notice is issued, the taxpayer will be facing civil and criminal
litigation at the same time. This may or may not be to the taxpayer's
advantage.62 The remote possibility exists that the Government will
55. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c) (1980). Bennett v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 114 (1958) held that:
once a non-fraudulent return is filed putting the Commissioner on notice of a tax-
payer's receipts and deductions, there can be no policy in favor of permitting assess-
ment thereafter at any time without limitation. We think the statute of limitations
begins to run with the filing of such return.
Id at 123-24. The Service has adopted this position in Rev. Rul. 79-178, 1979-1 C.B. 435.
56. 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c) (1980).
57. 26 U.S.C. § 6212 (1980).
58. INT. REV. MAN. 9325.2.
59. INT. REV. MAN. 9325.2(4)(b)2 and (d).
60. In United States v. Abatti, 463 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Calif. 1979), the court held that a
Tax Court decision in favor of taxpayer precluded the Government, by operation of collateral
estoppel, from prosecuting for tax evasion and making false returns.
61. The taxpayer may consent to an extension of the statute of limitations, 26 U.S.C.
§ 6501(c)(4) (1980) (civil statute).
62. The disadvantages of dual trials include substantially increased costs and legal fees
decide not to issue the notice or that the notice once issued so
prejudices the criminal case that criminal prosecution should be
avoided.
Filing a delinquent return can prove quite hazardous and many
are of the opinion that it serves no useful purpose.63 It is, however,
one affirmative act that the taxpayer can take in an effort to prevent
a criminal prosecution. At least two courts have noted that coopera-
tion with I.R.S. agents may be an indication of an absence of fraudu-
lent intent.A Similarly, cooperation with revenue agents supports
the taxpayer's contention that the nonfiling was merely negligent or
inadvertent.
V. Substantive Defenses
A. Did the Taxpayer File a Return?
On occasion a taxpayer will maintain that tax returns were filed
and that the I.R.S. computer records indicating he or she has not are
in error. In an excellent article on the subject of willful failure to
file,6 5 Jackson L. Boughner suggests that if counsel pressures the tax-
payer to produce proof of payment of his tax liabilities and copies of
his returns, the dishonest taxpayer will usually admit none were
filed. If, however, your client is steadfast in his contention, Liebert v.
United States66 provides guidance. Mr. Liebert was an attorney who
clung to the defense that he had fied returns, despite I.R.S. records
indicating that none had been received. Liebert's counsel made a
discovery motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)
for access to the Internal Revenue Service Center computer equip-
ment and a computer generated list of nonfilers. This motion was
granted by the trial court. Mr. Liebert intended to contact other in-
dividuals on the nonfilers list to determine whether they had in fact
filed returns. With this information in hand, Liebert could show that
the Government records were unreliable. Liebert also wanted his
computer expert to run tests on the I.R.S. computer systems. On ap-
peal, the Government argued that they would agree to provide other
information and data and access to the computers, but the list of
nonfilers should be protected. The Third Circuit agreed. Neverthe-
less, when it came time to permit access to the highly sophisticated
I.R.S. computer system, and other data as required by the court or-
and subjecting the taxpayer to the broad discovery in the civil case, which might be used in the
criminal trial.
63. See, e.g., BALTER, supra note 44, at 6.02(7).
64. See Toledano v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966); Melinder v. United
States, 281 F. Supp. 451 (W.D. Okla. 1968) (amended returns fied one and one-half months
after revenue agents appeared).
65. Boughner, supra note 7, at 48.
66. 519 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 485 (1976).
der, the Government failed to comply and the information was dis-
missed. The Government chose to disobey the discovery order and
risk dismissal of its case rather than disclose certain information that
it felt was importaht to protect. Before all the nonfilers of the world
ease a sigh of relief, it is reasonable to assume that a trial court may
not grant such a discovery motion unless (1) the taxpayer has main-
tained from the onset that he filed returns and (2) the taxpayer has
some proof that a return was filed, such as proof of payment of lia-
bilities or a copy of the return.67
B. Was the Nonfifing Willful?
The Supreme Court laid to rest a longstanding dispute as to the
definition of willfulness in United States v. Pomponio. 68 The Court
declared that the only necessary motive to establish willfulness is the
intentional violation of a known legal duty. It further held that evil
motive or bad purposes were not necessary elements of willfulness.69
The taxpayer's motive for not filing is, however, relevant when it
affects one of the elements of the offense as defined in Matosky. 0 In
Matosky, the taxpayer claimed that he did not file returns in order to
avoid detection and apprehension for other crimes he may have
committed. The court ruled that the taxpayer need not have a tax
related motive to be convicted for nonfiling. The court further stated
that the taxpayer's reasons for not filing are irrelevant as long as the
elements of the offense are proved." The taxpayer will often wish to
present evidence of his motive to rebut the Government's usual cir-
cumstantial proof of willfulness. Accordingly, the taxpayer's motive
will often prove relevant to the issue of willfulness as further dis-
cussed below.
1. Unsuccessful Defense Against Wilfulness. -In addition to
those unsuccessful lines of defense previously discussed,72 the fol-
lowing defenses have proven unsuccessful in mitigating willfulness
or otherwise precluding prosecution: (1) chronic alcoholism pre-
vented the taxpayer from forming the requisite criminal intent;73 (2)
67. Although the court opinions in Liebert give no indication whether these factors were
considered, it appears that Liebert offered no proof that he filed a return.
68. 429 U.S. 10 (1976).
69. The Court previously held in United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973) that will-
fulness has the same meaning in misdemeanor and felony sections of the Internal Revenue
Code.
70. United States v. Matosky, 421 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 904 (1970).
See United States v. Martin, 507 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1974) (trial court reversed for instructing
that motive was irrelevant).
71. See notes 8, 9 and accompanying text, supra. Cf. Oliver v. United States, 54 F.2d 48
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 543 (1931) (fear of reporting income from questionable sources
was indicative of willfulness).
72. See notes 4, 37, 38, 53, 54 and 70 supra.
73. United States v. Jalbert, 504 F.2d 892 (lst Cir. 1974).
Section 7203 is unconstitutional due to vagueness; 74 (3) the taxpayer
is confined to a hospital and gravely ill;75 (4) professional and do-
mestic pressures negated intent;76 (5) the taxpayer had no funds to
pay the tax;77 (6) the Government was aware of taxpayer's liability
because a partnership return was filed;78 (7) Federal Reserve Notes
are not legal tender;79 (8) the taxpayer was a victim of selective pros-
ecution because of his protester activities;80 and (9) the taxpayer
feared that filing a return would disclose previous nonfilings.8'
A defense that can be successful is to shift the blame to an ac-
countant or other representative who either (1) gave incorrect advice
after being told all the facts82 or (2) failed to file a return for the
taxpayer as promised.83
2. Two Common Defenses To Willfulness
a. Lack offunds plus belief that returns cannot be filed without
remittance. -A bona fide misunderstanding about one's duty to file a
return is a defense to section 7203.84 The most popular claim is that
the taxpayer lacked funds with which to pay the tax on or about
April 15 and had no idea that a return could be filed without remit-
tance. Although very few people actually know that a tax return can
be filed without remittance, when the defense is raised and offered,
the jury often rejects it." The defense may seem like an afterthought
or convenient excuse to the jurors. The taxpayer must almost con-
vince a jury that he believed that he was relieved of the filing obliga-
tion because of lack of funds. This is one defense that the
Government can easily rebut by showing that the taxpayer had ac-
cess to funds on or about the due date of the return.86
74. United States v. Ming, 466 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1972), cer. denied, 409 U.S. 915
(1973).
75. See In re Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1955) (U.S. Attorney has
discretion whether to prosecute); Treas. Dep't Info. Release No. S-2910 (Dec. 11, 1951).
76. Bernabei v. United States, 473 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Haseltine,
419 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Eustis, 409 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1969). Haskell v.
United States, 241 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957).
77. Ripperberger v. United States, 248 F.2d 944, 955 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 940 (1958); Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969
(1956).
78. United States v. Harrison, [1972-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9573 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
afl'd, [1973-11 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9295 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973). See
also United States v. Hayes, 11960-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9783 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
79. United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1976).
80. Id
81. United States v. Egan, 459 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 875 (1972).
82. Kuhn v. United States, 42 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1930).
83. United States v. Platt, 435 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1970).
84. Murdock v. United States, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Lemlich, 418 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
913 (1970).
86. See United States v. Hailer, 543 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1976) in which evidence of net
worth and expenditures were used to rebut a defense of lack of funds. The taxpayer did not
file a return when he later acquired funds, which cast doubt on his defense.
b. The tax protester. -An increasing number of taxpayers in
recent years have filed "returns" with only their name, social security
number and an assertion of the fifth amendment.87 This situation
raises two questions: (1) has a return been filed and (2) if not, is the
failure to file willful?
The answer to the first question is relatively clear. The docu-
ment filed will not be considered a return unless it provides sufficient
information from which the Commissioner can compute a liability.
88
One defense is to argue that the "return" filed contained sufficient
data for the Government to compute a liability albeit an incorrect
one. 8 9 In most protester cases the courts find that no return has been
filed.
Taxpayer arguments that all financial and business information
required by a return is protected from disclosure by the fifth amend-
ment have similarly been dismissed.9" The Supreme Court touched
on this issue in United States v. Sullivan,9' in which it stated
If the form of return provided called for answers that the defend-
ant was privileged from making, he could have raised that objec-
tion in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make
any return at all. It would be an extreme if not an extravagent
application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a
man to refuse to state the amount of his income because it had
been made a crime.
Although taxpayers can find some solace in the first sentence of the
above quote, the Court in Sullivan made a rather definitive state-
ment that the fifth amendment does not protect one from filing a
87. A recent variation of this protest is the filing of a Form 1040 that contains zeros in the
spaces provided for supplying financial information. Interestingly enough, the Ninth Circuit
has held that one cannot be convicted for failing to file a return when such a form is filed.
United States v. Long, [1980-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9480 (9th Cir. 1980). The court in
Long, however, suggested that the taxpayer may be subject to the criminal charge of filing a
false return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (1980). See United States v. Smith, [1980-21 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9480 (5th Cir. 1980) (forms containing zeros and constitutional objections did
not constitute a return).
Forms that fail to provide amounts, even zeros, will not be considered returns. United
States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.),
cer. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974). Cf. United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198 (105h Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978) (no return when only entry indicated that taxpayer was due
a refund).
88. Florsheim Bros. Dry Goods Co. v. United States, 280 U.S. 453 (1930); United States
v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1973)
(fifth amendment privilege does not extend to the failure to file a tax return); United States v.
Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). See discussion in note 87
supra
89. See note 87 supra. Counsel, however, may be subjecting the client to a false return
charge by presenting this argument.
To constitute a return the "return" must be werified by the taxpayer. See generally
United States v. Moore, [1980-21 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9627 (7th Cir. 1980).
90. United States v. Karsky, 610 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Edelson, 604
F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1979) (fifth amendment privilege is no defense to the charge of failing to file
a tax return).
91. 274 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1927).
return and that a form "return" without financial data will be no
return at all.
The tax protester, however, should get to the jury with the issue
of whether he misunderstood the legal right to assert the fifth
amendment and, therefore, lacked the requisite willfulness. In pro-
tester cases the Government will often introduce testimony about the
taxpayer's prior involvement in the tax protest movement.92 This
testimony is evidence that the taxpayer's activities were merely a
form of protesting the income tax laws and were not the result of a
misunderstanding or misinterpretation. To support its argument the
Government has been able to obtain the following jury instruction:
"A good faith misunderstanding of the law may negate willfulness
[but] a good faith disagreement with the law does not."9 3 Similarly,
the courts have admitted evidence of prior filings by the taxpayer to
demonstrate the lack of any good faith misunderstanding of the
law's filing requirements.94
As might be suspected the great majority of recent decisions




A defense to willful failure to file is often difficult but not insur-
mountable. The explanations for nonfiling are limitless.
The practitioner should raise all possible procedural, equitable
and substantive defenses as he can to Government representatives at
all stages of administration.96 If trial is necessary a key ingredient to
acquittal is the sincerity of the taxpayer. With over five million
nonfilers every year, the taxpayer may be lucky enough to find a
person on the jury who is one of those five million and who is every
bit as sincere as the taxpayer.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Francisco, [1980-1] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9196 (8th Cir.
1980) (I.R.S. had attempted to explain law to the taxpayer subsequent to prior nonfilings).
93. United States v. Karsky, 610 F.2d 548, 550 (8th Cir. 1980). In Karsky, taxpayer
claimed to have good faith but mistaken belief that the Internal Revenue Code is unconstitu-
tional and that the fifth amendment permits refusal to answer questions on the return).
94. United States v. Karsky, 610 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Wade, 585
F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1979).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Francisco, [1980-1] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9196 (8th Cir.
1980); United States v. Edelson, 604 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Evanko, 11979-21
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9544 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wade, 585 F.2d 573 (5th Cir.
1979) (amount of income not privileged although source of income may be).
96. A criminal defendant is entitled to have instructions presented relating to any theory
of defense for which any foundation in the evidence exists, no matter how weak or incredible
that evidence may be. United States v. O'Connor, 237 F.2d 466, 474 n.8 (2d Cir. 1956).

